User:JHadaway/sandbox
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THERE HAS BEEN A PLETHORA OF CRITICISM examining one of Ernest Hemingway's most powerful short stories, "Hills Like White Elephants." However, one approach that may merit more attention is an exploration of Hemingway's notions of "action" and of the irreversibility of action within the text. Hannah Arendt, an intellectual whose germinal work has transcended more than one discipline, may be useful in providing some measure of insight into Hemingway's problematic narrative.
I would like to begin by examining certain rhetorical elements of "Hills," which suggest traces of Arendt's perspectives on the "nature of action." More specifically, Arendt's influential study, The Human Condition, suggests that the dissonance found in the relationship between Jig and the American primarily arises from their differing viewpoints regarding the Arendtian notion of irreversibility.[a] That is to say, the issue is far more important than considerations of the potential abortion, which is the explicit topic of their combative dialogue, as critics have noted (Gillette 50-69; O'Brien 19-25; Rankin 234; Urgo 35). We might consider that Jig, in her overtly rhetorical exchanges with the American, illustrates (and promotes) the concept of irreversibility, as she suggests that the conception of life (an action, in essence, as it is a beginning) within her cannot be undone, while the American argues
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against irreversibility, as he believes that the conception can be "undone" by the act of abortion. As Stanley Renner Proffers in his "Moving to the Girl's Side of 'Hills Like White Elephants,'" "[I]n choosing whether to abort or to have the child, the couple are [sic] choosing between two ways of life" (28). This forty-minute exchange determining the end decision—abortion or life—reveals that the couple is also choosing between two ways of living—either living in such a way so that actions can be "undone," so to say, or living in such a way where actions bring consequences that are absolute.
Notes
- ↑ In order to combat irreversibility, according to Arendt, man must either make promises or bestow forgiveness on others, two actions that, by their nature, also require plurality, "for no one can forgive himself and no one can feel bound by a promise made only to himself" (237).